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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

'
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.

vs.

4747

ROBERT JOSEPlI S:\IELSEH,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATElHENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appellant was charged with grand larceny occurring in Utah County, Utah, January 27, 1969.
DISPOSITION IN LU\,VER COURT
The matter \Vas tried by jury before the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District, on l\<lay 12, 1969. The case was submitted to the
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jury, which returned a verdict of guilty of the crime
of grand larceny. The court denied defendant's Motion
for New Trial and sentenced the defendant to the Utah
State Prison for the indeterminate term provided by
law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the conviction and the
judgment thereon and for an order dismissing the case
or granting him a new trial.
·

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 27, 1969, the Gene Evans Pharmacy,
Provo, Utah, was burglarized, with watches, cash and
others items being taken. Their value is in excess of
$50.00.
Twenty-three days later, on February 19, 1969,
N. W. Hayward, a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff,
applied in the Salt Lake County District Court for a
warrant authorizing him to search the home of defendant at 1082 South 6th West, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for the property stolen in the pharmacy burglary. The
warrant issued, search made, property seized from the
defendanfs home, and returned to the issuing magistrate, Stewart Hanson. (R 32A, 32B). Two days later
the defendant was charged in this case in Utah County.
(R 4).
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At the preliminary hearing the search warrant
and its fruits were not used. Defendant was bound over
to trial on the testimony of Gene Evans, owner of the
pharmacy, that there had been a burglary and larceny,
and the testimony of Max W eenig that he had been in
the Utah County Jail while the defendant was awaiting bond, and that the defendant had told him he had
committed the subject crime. (R 3).
Before trial of the case, defendant made a Motion
to Suppress Evidence. (R 10-16, 28-30). This
was denied without consideration of its merits because
the search warrant and affidavit, not having been placed
in evidence at the preliminary hearing, and the State
being unwilling to concede at the Motion to Suppress
Evidence Hearing that it intended to use them, the
court had no warrant nor affidavit before it to rule upon.
(Tr. P6, Ll7-30).
At the trial, before the opening statements, defense counsel asked the district attorney if he would
use the subject search warrant and affidavit and the
fruits of the search. The district attorney said yes, and
then introduced Officer Hayward's affidavit and Judge
Hanson's warrant. Defense counsel consented to this for
the purpose of identifying the documents preparatory
to a Motion to Suppress. The Motion was then made
and denied by the court. During these proceedings the
jury was not present. (Tr. P4, L2-Pl6, L9).
Gene Evans testified for the prosecution that he
was owner o fthe Evans Pharmacy in Utah County,
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that it had been burglarized on January 27, 1969, that
certain items including paper money stapled together,
silver coins in money wrappers and Timex watches had
been taken. He identified Exhibit 3, a money wrapper, as
possibly having come from his store. (Tr. PIS, L25-Tr.
P22, L2). He identified 10 twenty-dollar bills, which
had perforations that might be staple marks, as being
similar to bills he had had in the pharmacy that were
taken in the burglary. He also identified mass-produced
Timex watches, Exhibit 6, as being the same kind taken
from him in the burglary. (Tr. P26, L3-Tr. P27, L27}.
Evelyn Morgan Austill was called by the prosecution and testified that she had been a clerk at the pharmacy at the time of the burglary. She identified the
coin wrappers as bearing her handwriting and the money
and watches as being similar to those carried at the
pharmacy. (Tr. P34, L5-P35, L5; Tr. 32, L2-9).
Officer Hayward testified for the prosecution. He
said that he was a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff,
that he obtained a search warrant, based on his affidavit, from the Third District Court, that he searched
the defendant's home on February 19, 1969, in Salt
Lake County, Utah, and that the items identified previously by Mr. Evans and Mrs. Austill were items he
had found in his search of defendant's home. (Hayward Tr. Pll, L24-P17, LIO). Officer Hayward
testified that he asked the defendant if he had anything
to say about the items at his home and that the defendant replied that he had nothing to say. (Hayward Tr.
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Pl9, L3-21). Officer Hayward further testified that
to his knowledge, defendant, defendant's wife and their
children all resided together at that same home. (Hayward Tr. P20, L9-ll).
The search warrant issued based on the statement
in Officer Hayward's deposition and affidavit in support
of the application for warrant that an informant had
made a buy of property identified as being stolen from
the Evans Pharmacy from the defendant, and that
this buy had been made at the request of Dave Reynolds, of the State Department of Business Regulation.
(R 32A, second sheet). On cross examination Officer
Hayward admitted that he didn't know whether the
informant had made the purchase before or after the
informant had talked to Mr. Reynolds. (Hayward Tr.
P7, L28-P8, L6). He also testified that he hadn't seen
the item himself and didn't personally know how it
connected to the burglary, although Mr. Reynolds had
advised him that there was a connection. (Hayward Tr.
P9, Ll2-16; P9, L22-Pl0, L8).
At the conclusion of Officer Hayward's testimony,
defense counsel moved the court suppress the evidence
obtained pursuant to the search warrant because Officer
Hayward's testimony showed a new, and vital, defect
in the affidavit. If the "buy" was not made under law
officer direction and control, then the circumstances
under which the "buy" was made, or the reliability of
the informant, became crucial to the existence of probable cause. This motion was denied and the case continued. (Hayward Tr. PIO, Ll5-Pll, LI3).

5

Max W eenig testified for the prosecution. He had
been an inmate of the Utah County Jail during the
few days that defendant was there between his arrest
and his posting bail. He testified that defendant told
him several times in detail how he had committed the
subject burglary and larceny. (Tr. P37, LIO-P39,
L24).

On cross examination l\'Ir. Weenig admitted that
he was serving a one-year term in the Utah County
Jail as a result of a felony probation violation ('Veenig
Tr. P2, Ll5-P5, L2) and testified that he was giving
information not as a result of promises or threats on
the part of any law enforcement officer. He testified
that he himself volunteered to "pump" the defendant
without being asked to do so. (Weenig Tr. Pl2, Ll428). \Vhen defense counsel sought to examine him as
to an ulterior motive for falsifying the court flatly disallowed the line of questioning. (Weenig Tr. P22,
L2-19).

The defendant did not take the stand and called
no witnesses in his behalf.
The prosecution introduced no physical evidence
such as fingerprints, clothing or eyewitnesses to connect the defendant to the crime. The State's case rests
entirely on possession 24 days later plus admissions to
a fellow jail mate.
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POINT I
THE COURT
PREJUDICIAL ERROR HY REFUSING TO ALLOW
EXAMINATION OF
WEENIG AS TO
HIS MOTIVES .FOR TESTIFYING.
No issue of police force or promises was involved
Weenig volunteered to to "pump" the debecause
fendant. ( \Veenig Tr. PI2, LI4-28). The issue was
not external, such as threats or promises, but internal,
his hope of gain.
Mr. W eenig was not an ordinary, uneducated
criminal; he was a former businessman. In fact, he had
run his own business in the same building where the
EYans Pharmacy was located and knew the premises
intimately. (Weenig Tr. Pl4, Ll2-Pl5, LI). Mr.
\V eenig was serving a one-year Utah County Jail sentence for probation violation starting in December
1968, and with 10 months still to go, when Mr. Smelser
was also at the jail. (Weenig Tr. P2, LI6-P3, L25).
Mr. 'Veenig knew the premises of the Evans Pharmacy. The story of the means and route of the burglary had been in the Provo newspapers and, of course,
talked about within the jail. It is entirely possible that
his testimony was based on this knowledge, without
defendant ever having talked to Mr. 'Veenig about
the matter. He did err, for example, on an important
point that might have been only within the knowledge
of the actual burglar: Mr. '"" eenig testified that the
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defendant told him the bulk of the loot was in $20.00
bills and the total cash taken was $7,800.00, not $5,700.00, as alleged in the complaint. (Weenig Tr. P5,
Ll0-18). In fact, the bulk of the loot was forty $100.00
bills and the total was $5,700.00. (Tr. 21, L25-28).
Why did Mr. W eenig volunteer to "pump" the
defendant? From defense counsel's experience, he has
been advised that "squealers" are not entirely safe
among their fellow inmates. It is also possible that a
"squealer" might gain favor by being an informant
on his fellow inmates. Mr. W eenig might have hoped
to save 10 months in jail by giving information against
the defendant. If that were the case, whether he actually got information from the defendant, or only said
that he had in a plausible fashion, either way he could
have a genuine hope of gain. The court flatly refused
to allow examination of Mr. W eenig on this point:
"Q Now you say you saw the Deputy Sheriff,
Mack Holley, and said you thought you could pump
information out of Smelser on this burglary, right?

A Yes, sir.

Q Have you been in the habit of reporting to the

authorities on what prisoners tell you?
MR. GAMMON: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.

Q. (By Mr. King) You had a reason for doing
-for talking to Mack Holley, didn't you?
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MR. GAJ.VIJ.VION: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.

Q (By Mr. King) Did you hope to gam some-

thing by telling the authorities-

MR. GAMMON: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained. You are arguing to
the jury now, Mr. King. This isn't the time yet for that.
There will be a time for that, but not now, with this
witness."
(Weenig Tr. P22, L2-19).
The court misconstrued the thrust of the questions.
Because there was no claim that the witness was acting
under coercion or promises, the court apparently felt
that concluded inquiry into his motives for testifying.
However, there was another equally pertinent area
going directly to the credibility of the witness, as stated
in Jones on Evidence, 5th Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 916,
P. 1717, "The rule is well settled that, on cross examination, questions which tend to impeach the impartiality
of the witness, while not directly relevant to the issue
on trial, are relevant in the sense that the persuasive
quality is affected by the discrediting testimony." Jones
continues on to draw the line of judicial discretion not
as to the right to cross examine as to motive, but only
as to the extent of the cross-examination, "Frequently,
it has been held to be error not to permit
nation as to the state of feelings or bias of the witness.
But a question as to the extent of such cross-exami ·
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nation is to be resolved in view of the discretion of the
court." (ibid P. 1722) . The flat error of the trial court
was in refusing to allow any cross-examination as to
self-interest on the part of the witness. Mr. \Veenig
was not a cumulative witness. There was no connection
between the defendant and the crime of larceny as
opposed to possible possession, other than the testimony
of Mr. W eenig, so he was a vital witness.
78-24-1UCA1953, provides "who may be witnesses
-jury to judge credibility .... Neither parties nor other
persons who have an interest in the event of an action
or proceeding are excluded; . . . although, in every
case the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, by the manner in which he testifies, by the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his character for truth, honesty, or integrity, or by his motives,
or by contradictory evidence; and the jury are the exclusive judges of this credibility."
"The interest of a witness in any particular case
in which he becomes a witness may always be shown,
and the effect, if any, of such interest upon the weight
of the testimony, is always a question for the jury.
State v. Cerar, 60 U 208, 220, 207 P. 597.
The error of the court in not allowing cross-examination as to motive was prejudicial error, because the
credibility of the witness was crucial, and a proper
examination into his motives might well have effected
the outcome of the case. Stat.e v. Neal, 1 U 2d 122,
262 P. 2d 756, 759; State v. Cluff, 48 U 102, 158 P.
701; J eMen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 U 366, 270 P. 349.
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POINT 2
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER
7 CONSTITUTED A COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE, CONSTITUTING PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY STATING " . . . HAVING REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THAT
HIS POSSESSION WAS HONESTLY ACQUIRED, HE REFUES OR FAILS TO DO SO,
SUCH CONDUCT IS A CIRCUMSTANCE
THAT TENDS TO SHOW HIS GUILT."
"76-38-1. De:frnition.-Larceny is the felonious

stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away the
personal property of another. Possession of property
recently stolen, when the person in possession fails to
make a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence of guilt."
Instruction no. 7. "The mere possession of stolen
property, howsoever soon after the taking, unexplained
by the person having possession is not sufficient to
justify conviction. It is, however, a circumstance to be
considered in connection with other evidence in determining the question of innocence or guilt. If you should
find from the evidence that the property involved in
this case was stolen, and that thereafter the defendant
was found in possession or claimed to be the owner of
the stolen property, such a fact would be a circumstance
tending in some degree to show guilt, although not sufficient, standing alone and unsupported by other evidence, to warrant finding him guilty. In addition to
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proof of possession of such property there must be
proof of corroborating circumstances tending, of themselves, to establish guilt. Such corroborating circum.stances may consist of the acts, conduct, falsehood, if
any, or other declaration, if any, of the defendant or
any other proved circumstance tending to show the
guilt of the accused.
One who is found in the possession of stolen property is bound to explain such possession in order to
remove the effect of that fact as a circumstance, to be
considered with all other evidence, point.ing to his guilt,
and if he gives a false account of how he acquired that
possession or, having reasonable opportunity to show
that his possession was honestly acquired, he refuses
or fails to do so, such conduct is a circumstance that
tends to show his guilt." (Emphasis added) (R. 22).
The purpose of the underlined section of the statute
is to allow the court to determine as a matter of law
if the state has made a prima facie case. If the state has,
the case goes to the jury. If the state has not, the case
does not go to the jury. However, an instruction, thrice
repeated, constituting a comment on the evidence by
the court, that unexplained recent possession "is a circumstance that tends to show his guilt," goes beyond
statutory authority. It is error to instruct the jury on
the question of what constitutes a prima facie case.
State v. Crowder, 114 U 202, 197 P. 2d 917. "This
statute is addressed only to the court, it determines
for the court what evidence is sufficient to constitute

12

a prima facie case, and it is the duty of the court when
a prima facie case has been made to submit it to the
jury, but it does not require the court to instruct the
jury that such facts constitute a prima facie case. The
jury is not concerned with that problem, they are only
concerned with whether all of the evidence is suff iciently convincing of defendant's guilt. This court has
repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury on
that question."
Here the court's instruction states unequivocally
"such a fact to be a circumstance tending in some degree to show guilt," "such conduct is a circumstance
that tends to show his guilt," and, the defendant "is
bound to explain such possession in order to remove the
effect of that fact as a circumstance, to be considered
with all other evidence, pointing to his guilt." These
are comments on the evidence. These do carry to the
jury the prima facie case that is reserved to the court
as a matter of law. The only other evidence, other than
possession, connecting the defendant to the crime was
not eyewitness, nor physical, such as fingerprints, but
only the highly questionable testimony of Max W eenig.
In State v. Crowder, supra, while the court affirmed
the conviction, it went on to say "were the evidence
of guilt susceptible to considerable doubt, it is not at
all certain that the giving of such an instruction would
not be prejudical."
As another issue within this point, recent case holdings have made it clear that a defendant is not required
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to give evidence against himself at any stage of any
criminal proceeding, either before or after his arrest.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L
Ed 2d 694. The statute in question states that a person
who "fails to make a satisfactory explanation shall be
deemed prima facie." The statute does not say that no
explanation is an unsatisfactory explanation. In this
case, the defendant made no explanation. (Hayward
Tr. Pl9, L5-21). To hold that no explanation is
an unsatisfactory explanation is to require self-incrimination. If a defendant voluntarily gives a statement,
and the statement is false, the statute would apply.
No Utah case deals specifically with a "no explanation"
case under the present statute. State v. Hart, 10 U
204, 37 P. 331, was a decision before the present statute
was enacted. Nevertheless, it bears on point, holding
that the state needs ( 1) recent possession and ( 2) an
unsatisfactory explanation. State v. Hart, has been
cited with approval in Utah cases since enactment of
the statute in its present form, such as State v. Nichols,
106 U 104, 145 P.2d 802. In this case we have four
factors: First, the defendant shared possession of his
home with his wife and children. Second, he was found
in possession twenty-four days later. Third, he gave
no false or inconsistent explanation as required by Hart,
supra. Fourth, there was no other corroborating evidence except W eenig.
It was error for the court to instruct the jury three
times as to the inference of guilt. Whether the error
was prejudicial, from the Utah rulings seems to depend
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on the circumstances of the case. With the existing circumstances and factors, such error is prejudicial in
nature, because without such an instruction, the jury
might have well reached a different verdict, and this
is a basic test of prejudicial error. State v. Cluff, supra;
Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., supra.

POINT 3
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE
SE A R CH
OF DEFENDANT'S HOME
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT ON WHICH THE
SEARCH WARRANT WAS ISSUED WAS INADEQUATE TO STATE PROBABLE CAUSE.
Evidence obtained in a search should be suppressed
if the search warrant issued upon an affidavit inadequate to state probable cause. State v. Jasso, 21 U 2d
24, 439 P.2d 844.
It is conceded at the outset that the affidavit need
not be finely technical, it can incorporate reliable heresay and observations of others than the affiant, but it
must state fact. No case sets this forth better than a
1939 Utah case, Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 U 471, 93 P.2d
920. In that case, the court was called upon to decide
squarely a definition of probable cause because it was
faced with a statute under which a search warrant
issued, but the requirements of the statute were slightly
less than the requirements of the Utah Constitution.
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{95-2-10 Utah Laws 1933, as opposed to Article I,
Sec. 14, Utah Constitution). The court stated, 97 Utah
at 481, "The whole case upon which a search warrant

issues must be made by him who prays for such writ.
The judicial officer before whom an application for a
search warrant is filed must exercise his judicial power
to determine whether or not the warrant shall issue·
such judicial function can be moved only by the facts
brought before him, which are under oath or affirmation. A warrant to search and seize, which follows upon
a statement based solely upon the belief of the affiant,
rests upon the reasoning of the affiant, based upon the
secret facts of which he may have knowledge, and the
conclusions which result from such reasoning are affiant's not those of the judical officer. The judicial process to ascertain probable cause is then transferred
from the judicial officer to the affiant. The Constitution
permits no such thing."
)

Applying the rule that the affidavit must state
facts and migistrate draw the conclusions, the affidavit
in the case now before the court states "your affiant is
now and has been for the past 15 years assigned to the
Detective Detail thereof.
"On the date of February 19, 1969, at approximately 9 :00 a.m., your affiant (received information
from) Dave Reynolds, who received the information
from a confidential informant that items on the attached
list are in the possession of Robert Smelser at the aforementioned address. Dave Reyonlds, Dept .of Business
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Regulation, through the confidential informant did
make a buy from Smelser and has identified the
as coming from a burglary of Gene Evans Pharmacy
at Provo, Utah." (R 32A, sheet 2, list of property at
R 32A sheet 4).
The particular defects of the affidavit are that it
alleges that defendant has certain property in his possession with a list attached to the affidavit describing
the property. However, the affidavit in no way states
that the property on the
is stolen property, nor
describes the "item" purchased, nor relates it to the list
of property. It simply states that defendant has possession to wit: "Dave Reynolds, who received the information from a confidential informant that items on
the attached list are in the possession of Robert Smelser
at the aforementioned address."
Based on the foregoing, any conclusion that the
property in the possession of the defendant is in any
way related to stolen property is entirely the conclusion of the aff iant based on facts which he does not
relate in the affidavit.
The affidavit further complicates matters by alleging that the defendant sold stolen property. It in no
way identifies what the property was, nor how it was
identified as being connected with the burglary of the
Gene Evans Pharmacy. These facts again are left to
the knowledge of the affiant, and are not submitted to
the court, to wit: "Dave Reynolds, Department of Business Regulations, through the confidential informant

17

did make buy from Smelser and has identified the same
as coming from a burglary of Gene Evans Pharmacy,
at Provo, Utah."
The affidavit leaves these questions unanswered:
( 1) If the defendant has possession of the property
itemized on the list, what facts are there in the affidavit
to connect the property to a burglary? ( 2) If Dave
Reynolds caused something to be bought from the defendant, what was bought? ( 3) If Dave Reynolds
caused something to be bought from the defendant,
what proof is there that it was stolen other than his
conclusion?
Reliability of the informant is not of importance
based on the face of this affidavit because it says the
informant acted under police control and direction,
even though the affiant officer relied on information
given him by another officer. A similar case is U.S. v.
Ventresca, 380 US 102, 85 S Ct 7 41, 13 L Ed 2d 684.
There, a search warrant issued for a search of a premises
where illegal distilling was suspected based on a factually detailed affidavit of an officer that he and other
officers had observed the premises, had seen sugar bags
going in, five gallon cans coming out, smelled mash
and heard sounds of machinery. The case held that
hearsay is acceptable, even though not technically evidentiary if it incorporated the reports of other officers.
It applied the test of reliability of information, not
evidentiary perfection. It stated "a recital of some of
the underlying circumstances is essential if the magis-

18

trate is to perform a detached function and not serve
merely as a rubber stamp for the police." Applying
the Yentresca rationale, however, the questions of
identity of the items is utterly unrevealed in the affidavit. This is crucial to a search warrant issued, as this
one, under 77-54-2 (I) UCA 1953, on possession of
stolen property. The property itself is crucial, yet the
facts by which the property is identified are unknown.

POINT 4
THE EYIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT
TO THE SEARCH WARRANT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE
'V ARRANT ITSELF WAS ISSUED 'VITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE, BECAUSE THE
AFFIANT DIDN'T KNOW AT ALL WHETHER HIS AFFIDAVIT WAS TRUE ORF ALSE
ON A VITAL POINT.
The point here is the accuracy of the affidavit,
not its face value. The facts are: In his affidavit for
issuance of the search warrant (R 32A, sheet 2) Deputy
Hayward swore that an informant acting under law
officer direction and control bought stolen property
from defendant, as follows: "Dave Reynolds, Department of Business Regulation, through the confidential
informant did make a buy from Smelser ... " At no
stage of this case has the informant, nor Dave Reynolds, made any appearance. The State chose to support
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the facts alleged in the affidavit solely on the basis of
Officer Hayward's testimony at the trial.
At the trial, Officer Hayward was called as a witness by the state to identify the property in evidence
as property he seized at def endanfs home pursant to
the warrant. (Hayward Tr. P4, Ll7-27). At that
point, the trial proceedings were interrupted by defense counsel, who was allowed to voir dire the witness
in regard to the warrant. This would not be timely
under ordinary procedures, but was necessary in this
case because the affidavit, warrant, and return on
warrant were all in Salt Lake County, ( R. 32A, 32B).
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence made prior
to the trial had been denied because the State refused
to admit it would use the subject warrant and evidence
obtained thereby, so that the trial court had nothing to
act upon, (Hayward Tr. P6, Ll-16). The trial court
allowed the mid-trial examination and Motion to Suppress on this basis. (Hayward Tr. P6, Ll-16).
Officer Hayward then testified on voir dire,
"Q Did Officer Reynolds tell you he, himself, had
made the purchase?
A He said the informant had made the purchase

for him.

Q Was that at his request?

A I would imagine it was sir, I don't know.
THE COURT: You don't know?

A No, sir.
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Q (By Mr. King) Do you know whether or not
the informant made the purchase before Officer Reynolds asked him to do so?
A I don't understand the question.

Q Did the informant make the purchase before
or after he talked to Officer Reynolds?

A I don't know that.
Q You don't know?
A No, sir.

Q. Was it the informant who identified the item
as being part of the property stolen from the Evans
Pharmacy?
A Mr. Reynolds was the one that identified it
through the list of stolen items he had been furnished
by Provo City. That was my understanding on it, Mr.
King."

(Hayward Tr. P7, L20-P8, LII).
"Q Did you ever see the item that the informant
obtained?

A No, sir. That is still in the possession of Officer
Reynolds.
Q So you don't know of your own knowledge how
it connected to the Evans burglary?

A No, sir."

(Hayward Tr. P9, Ll2-18).
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The effect of this testimony is that Officer Hay.
ward's affidavit stating that "Dave Reynolds did make
a buy through the confidential informant," is false. Offi.
cer Hayward didn't know if this is what happened
or if the informant made the purported buy on his ow 11
and then reported it after the purported act was done .
.No statement of fact can actually be supported beyond
the hypothetical following affidavit which is all that
Officer Hayward could really have sworn to, "An
informant, unknown to me, alleged to another officer
that he bought an item from the defendant which was
stolen from the Evans Pharmacy. I don't know what
the item i,s, nor how it connected to the burglary, but
I am told by Officer Reynolds that it corresponds to
the property named on the list of property stolen from
the pharmacy. I don't know who prepared the list, or
whether the list is accurate, or whether the subject
item is unique and identifiable, or a mass-produced
item not traceable specifically to the pharmacy. However, on the report of this unknown informant, the
defendant may have possession of the stolen property
and I would like to make a search."
This would have been an honest affidavit. It is
submitted, as argument, that if an officer could obtain
a warrant without probable cause by distortion of what
he knows, and the warrant stand up and the evidence
go in, then the constitutional guarantees of sanctity
of the home would be nullified and officers encouraged
to falsify.
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There are actually two separate issues that must
be considered. First, because the warrant actually rests
simply on the report of an informant, is his credibility
adequately established? Second, once the search warrant has been issued by a magistrate, is the affidavit
itself subject to factual attack?
As to the first is.sue, the case is clear. Returning
to Allen V. Lindbeck, supra, probable cause means
that the magistrate must have enough facts at his
disposal to make an intelligent determination that a
search warrant is proper. How can such a warrant
issue when the source of the information is unknown
and uncorroborated? The affidavit of Officer Hayward
doesn't even refer to the information as "reliable" or
"credible", but only as "confidential." (R 32A, sheet
2) . There is a plenitude of cases dealing with the credibility of the informant, when this is the key to whether
cause is probable. Spinelli v. U.S., 21 L Ed 2d 637,
dealing with a fact situation where the affidavit was
based part on observations of police and part, but cru"."
cially, on reliability of informant, sets forth a two-part
test that ( 1) the affidavit must set forth sufficient
underlying circumstances necessary for the magistrate
to make an independent judgment, and (2) must give
factual detail on why an informant is reliable and more
than the allegation that the informant is reliable or
credible is necessary. Such would be only a conclusion.
Supporting cases are U.S. v. Ventresca, supra; Rugendorf v. U.S., 376 US 528, 11 L Ed 2d 887, 84 S Ct
825; Draper v. U.S., 358 US 307, 3 L Ed 2d 327, 79
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S Ct 329; Aquilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 12 L Ed
2d 723, 84 S Ct 1509.
As to the second point, once the affidavit has issued
is it subject to attack as to its accuracy? Regendorf
v. U.S., supra, states "The court has never passed
directly on the extent to which a court may permit such
examination when a search warrant is valid on its face
and when the allegations of the underlying affidavit
establish probable cause." The court then goes on to
allow the attack, although denying the claim, because
the factual inaccuracies of the affidavit weren't material.
Following the Regendorf decision, several cases
have touched on the point. The most detailed discussion
is contained in U.S. v. Halsey, 257 FS 1004, SDNY,
1966. The problem is administrative--creating a trial
within a trial and opening the way for delaying tactics.
The court held, 257 FS 1005, "viewing the problem
in the broad sense of defendant's submission, we reject
'the contention. This is not to say that there may never
be occasions for trying out the truth of an affidavit on
which a search warrant issues. It is only to say that
there is no justification for allowing such a de novo
trial of the issuing magistrate's determination as a
routine stipulation in every case. Until or unless the
defendant has at least made some initial showing of
some potential infirmity he proposes to demonstrate,
the magistrate's acceptance of the affidavit as truthful
should be enough." U.S. v. Halsey has been affirmed
in U.S. v. Bowling, 351 F 2d 241; U.S. v. Suarez, 380
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.F 2d 715 ("It may be that testimony at trial could
so clearly demolish a .statement in an affidavit supporting a warrant, that a prior denial of a motion to suppress would be overruled."); U.S. v. Gillette, 383 F 2d
843, 848 ("We by no means forestall the possibility that,
in the appropriate circumstances, a hearing should be
held to establish the veracity of sworn allegations in
an affidavit which is sufficient on its face.")
Defendant accepts the rationale of these cases.
Attack on the accuracy of an affidavit for search warrant can create major problems. However, for the courts
to turn their back when it is known that the affidavit
is false is to deny the necessary for truth in sworn
affidavits to magistrates.
In this case, Officer Hayward swore a "buy" had
been made under police control, when he had no knowledge at all that this was the fact. Police observations,
and action taken under police control, usually are prima
facie probable cause. However, the acts of unknown
informants do not constitute probable cause. For them
there must be support; here there was no support. Defendant's procedure could have been no more timely
than it was. The evidence should be suppressed.
Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL KING
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Robert Joseph Smelser,
Defendant-Appellant
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